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National Security or Consumer Privacy? A Question Even Siri Couldn’t Answer 
By: Rebecca Knight 
 
 On December 2, 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik attacked Farook’s office 
holiday party, killing fourteen people and wounding over twenty others, in what officials are investigating 
as an act of terrorism.1 In the course of this investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) seized 
an iPhone 5c pursuant to a federal search warrant authorizing the search of a black Lexus IS300.2 The 
iPhone was owned and issued to Farook by his employer, the San Bernardino County Department of Public 
Health (“SBCDPH”), as part of his employment.3 In addition to the issued work phone, agents also 
examined two other mobile devices belonging to Farook and Malik that were obtained, destroyed and 
discarded, from the trash behind the Farook residence.4 SBCDPH gave consent for the iPhone to be 
searched, but it was locked and secured by a numeric passcode created by Farook.5 Despite the phone 
being locked, FBI agents were able to find evidence in the phone’s iCloud account indicating that Farook 
had communicated with co-workers that would later become victims during the mass shooting.6 Agents 
believed that there may be “relevant, critical communications and data” on the phone from around the 
time of the shooting, but the information would reside solely on the phone itself.7 However, without the 
passcode, the information could not be accessed by any means known to the government or Apple 
because of the powerful passcode system and encryptions8 embedded in the iPhone’s operating system 
and hardware.9 Thus, the battle between the FBI and Apple over providing assistance to hack into Farook’s 
iPhone began.  
The FBI’s Position 
 On February 16, 2016, the United States of America (“Government”) filed an ex parte application 
pursuant to the All Writs Act (“Act”) for an order compelling Apple to provide assistance to FBI agents in 
their search of Farook’s iPhone.10  Originally enacted in 1789, the Act provides that “[t]he Supreme Court 
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and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”11 The Government claimed 
that only Apple had the “exclusive technical means” to assist the FBI in completing the search, but Apple 
declined to provide the assistance voluntarily.12 Apple manufactured the iPhone and created the 
operating systems and software, thus it could easily modify the operating system and disable software.13 
On older operating systems, Apple has the ability to obtain unencrypted information from iPhones 
without the passcode, and has done so before to help law enforcement execute search warrants in 
accordance with accompanying All Writs Act orders.14 However, the operating system running on newer 
iPhones was designed to provide much greater protection to the iPhone’s owner so that even Apple could 
not bypass the system.15 Regardless, the Government maintained that because Apple built the iPhone it 
could also hack into Farook’s. 
 The FBI sought Apple’s assistance with two objectives: (1) removal of security features such as 
auto-erase and delays coded into the operating system; and (2) modification of the data encryption 
embedded into iPhone hardware.16 With respect to the first objective, the FBI was unable to search the 
device because it was locked by a secure, user-determined, numeric passcode.17 The FBI could not make 
attempts to determine the passcode because Apple had coded an auto-erase function into the iPhone’s 
operating system.18 After ten erroneous attempts at entering the passcode, the auto-erase function 
activates and permanently deletes all encrypted information contained on the device.19 In addition to the 
auto-erase function, Apple had also created a delay after every erroneous passcode entered, locking the 
phone for increasing amounts of time before another passcode entry can be attempted.20 This means that 
after every failed passcode entry attempt, the user must wait for a set amount of time before another 
attempt can be made, up to an hour by the ninth attempt.21 The FBI wanted Apple to disable both security 
features. 
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 With respect to the second objective, Apple had designed the iOS 9 operating system for iPhones 
to encrypt the data files found on the devices using two components: (1) the user-determined passcode; 
and (2) a unique 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (“AES”) key that is embedded into the phone itself 
during manufacturing.22 Both components must be satisfied in order for the operating system to decrypt 
the phone’s data.23 When the user inputs a passcode, the phone conducts a complex calculation through 
Apple’s software.24 This complex calculation combined with the AES unlocks and decrypts the data on the 
phone.25 This encryption process is the root of the Government’s problem. The Government believes that 
because Apple designed, implements, and updates the iOS operating system, it also has the technical 
capabilities to modify the system to enable the FBI to hack into Farook’s phone.26 As such, the Government 
requested that Apple be ordered to provide the FBI with a custom software file with a unique identifier 
that can be loaded onto the device.27 Once loaded, the custom software would have three primary 
functions: (1) bypass or disable the auto-erase function; (2) enable the FBI to submit passcodes to the 
iPhone electronically for testing; and (3) eliminate any additional delays between failed passcode 
attempts beyond what is incurred by the hardware on the device.28 The software would be installed on 
Farook’s iPhone at either a government facility, or alternatively, at an Apple facility, but any passcode 
attempts would be made by the Government. The Government also requested that the order permit 
Apple to satisfy the three functions by the software requested or by an alternative technical manner, but 
the alternative means must be mutually agreeable.29  
 The Government argued that the order to compel Apple’s assistance was permitted by the All 
Writs Act, which allows a court, in its “sound judgment” to issue orders necessary “to achieve the rational 
ends of law” and “the ends of justice entrusted to it.”30 The Government further contended that the Court 
has the authority “in aid of a valid warrant, to order a third party to provide nonburdensome technical 
assistance to law enforcement officers” to facilitate the execution of the search warrant.31 This contention 
relied heavily on United States v. New York Telephone Co., a 1977 Supreme Court decision, which upheld 
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an order directing a phone company to help the government execute a pen register search warrant issued 
under Rule 41.32  
 New York Telephone Co. established three factors to determine whether an All Writs Act order to 
the phone company is appropriate.33 The factors are: (1) whether the third-party is not “so far removed 
from the underlying controversy that its assistance could not be permissibly compelled;” (2) whether the 
order is likely to place any unreasonable burden on the third-party; and (3) whether the assistance of the 
third-party is necessary to effectuate the warrant.34 The Government argued that each factor supported 
the issuance of the order directed to Apple.35  
First, the Government contended that Apple is not far removed from the matter because it 
designed, manufactured, and sold the iPhone; in addition, Apple wrote and owns the software that is 
preventing the Government from executing the warrant.36 IPhones can only run software 
cryptographically signed by Apple.37 Access to the code that creates that software is restricted to Apple. 
Thus, no other party, except for Apple, has the ability to assist the Government in manipulating the 
software.38  
Second, the Government contended that the order would not place any unreasonable burden on 
Apple because compliance would require little effort for Apple, and reasonable reimbursement for that 
effort would be available.39 The order would require Apple to write software code, but, the Government 
alleged, that is not an unreasonable burden on a company that writes software code in its regular course 
of business.40  
Third, the Government argued that Apple’s assistance was necessary to fully execute the search 
warrant.41 Full execution of the warrant is necessary because Farook is believed to have caused “the mass 
murder of a large number of his coworkers” and “built bombs and hoarded weapons for this purpose.”42 
Evidence from the phone’s iCloud account demonstrated that Farook communicated with victims of the 
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shooting, as well as Malik, and the most recent backup was done in October 19, 2015 (a month and a half 
before the shooting).43 The last backup indicated to the FBI that Farook may have disabled the automatic 
iCloud backup function to hide evidence, such as accomplices or plans for other attacks, which can now 
be found only on the device itself.44 For all of these reasons, the Government requested that the court 
order Apple to assist the FBI in the searching the iPhone in accordance with its proposed order. 
The Order 
 On the same day the ex parte application was filed by the Government, Magistrate Judge Sheri 
Pym granted the order compelling Apple to assist the FBI in searching the iPhone.45 It was ordered that: 
(1) Apple should assist in enabling the search of Farook’s iPhone 5c by providing reasonable assistance to 
law enforcement to obtain access to the data on the phone; (2) the assistance should accomplish the 
three primary functions previously mentioned; (3) Apple’s reasonable assistance may include providing 
the FBI with the software described above to be loaded onto the device; (4) if Apple determines that it 
can achieve the three primary functions using an alternative technological means, then Apple could 
comply with the Order that way, as long as the Government approves; and (5) Apple should advise the 
Government of the reasonable costs of providing its assistance.46 This was the first time a judge issued 
such an order for an iPhone running Apple’s iOS 9 operating system.47  
Apple’s Position 
 In true Apple fashion, CEO Tim Cook took the battle to the people first, and to the courts second.48 
In a message addressed to Apple customers, Cook wrote that: “[t]he United States government has 
demanded that Apple take an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We 
oppose this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.”49 Cook went on to explain 
that Apple has no sympathy for terrorists and provided the FBI with all of the data requested that was in 
its possession.50 Apple complied with all subpoenas and search warrants, made engineers available to 
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advise the FBI, and offered ideas on investigative options at its disposal.51 But then the Government asked 
for something that Apple did not have, and something that it considers “too dangerous” to create, and 
that is a “backdoor to the iPhone.”52 Cook proclaimed that a backdoor would be a “master key” that could 
be used to unlock any iPhone which would undermine decades of technological advancements to protect 
iPhone users from hackers and cybercriminals.53 Apple believed that the FBI’s intentions were good, but 
that it would be wrong for the government to force it to weaken its Apple products, especially when there 
is no way to guarantee that the technique would be limited to just Farook’s phone. Cook concluded that 
Apple fears the Order would “undermine the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to 
protect.” These sentiments are reflected in Apple’s Motion to Vacate filed on February 25, 2016.54 
 Apple’s position was simple. The Order was not about one iPhone; it was about the privacy 
interests of millions of iPhone users around the globe.55 Apple’s motion began with an emphasis on the 
necessity for increased security in a modern world dependent on technology.56 Apple claimed that since 
the beginning of the computer age, there have been people dedicated to breaching the security of 
technology and stealing the personal information stored therein.57 Apple highlighted that even the 
Government has fallen victim to hackers, cybercriminals, and foreign agents on a regular basis, including 
a breach that affected 22 million federal workers and their family members.58 Knowing that the stakes are 
high, Apple claimed that it has dedicated itself to enhancing the security of its devices, so that customers 
are confident that their private information – financial records, credit card information, health 
information, physical location, calendars, family photographs, personal messages – are all protected.59 In 
order to protect its customers and their private information, Apple uses encryption and improves security 
with every software release, because breaches are becoming more frequent and highly sophisticated.60 
Apple believes that encryption provides the strongest means to ensure the safety and privacy of its 
customers, and the Government now seeks to undermine that protection through the Order.61 To that 
end, Apple argued that: 
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Rather than pursue new legislation, the government backed away from Congress and 
turned to the courts, a forum ill-suited to address the myriad [of] competing interests, 
potential ramifications, and unintended consequences presented by the government’s 
unprecedented demand. And more importantly, by invoking ‘terrorism’ and moving ex 
parte behind closed courtroom doors, the government sought to cut off debate and 
circumvent thoughtful analysis.62  
 
Essentially, Apple’s argument was that Congress, not the courts, should determine when a third-party 
must be compelled to assist in investigations conducted by the government. Additionally, Apple 
contended that if the technology that the Government wants were to be created, millions of people would 
be at risk of having their personal data hacked at no fault of their own but rather as a consequence of 
Farook’s act of terrorism.63 
 Legally, Apple argued that the Order had no statutory basis and violated the Constitution. 
Vehemently opposing the Government’s use of the All Writs Act to secure the Order, Apple contended 
that the Act is intended to enable the federal courts to fill in gaps in the law, not provide the courts with 
unlimited and unrestrained power.64 More specifically, Apple maintained that the Act does not grant 
authority to compel assistance when Congress has considered but decided not to permit such authority.65 
In the Communications Assistance of Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”)66, Congress decided not to require 
electronic communication service providers to facilitate the government’s decryption of devices.67 Apple 
claimed that it is an electronic communication service provider because it makes mobile phones and 
provides customers with messaging services through iPhones.68 As such, Apple argued, the Government 
may not use the All Writs Act to do what Congress refused to allow in the CALEA.69 Thus, according to 
Apple, the court’s Order expanded the obligations under the CALEA, and violated the separation-of-
powers by performing a legislative function when it repurposed the statute to meet the Government’s 
request.70 
 Next, Apple argued that the factors established by New York Telephone Co. were not met, so the 
court was not permitted to order the “unprecedented and unreasonably burdensome” assistance 
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requested by the Government.71 First, Apple contended that its connection to the underlying case was 
too far removed to compel assistance.72 Specifically, Apple claimed that it is a private company that does 
not own or possess the phone at issue, has no connection to the data sought from the phone, and is not 
related in any way to the mass shooting that gave rise to the investigation.73 Apple merely placed a good 
into the stream of commerce, and cannot be linked to an alleged terrorist because it did.74  
Second, Apple argued that, if carried out, the Order would impose an “unprecedented and 
oppressive” burden on Apple because it would require Apple to develop software and a system that does 
not exist.75 Experienced Apple engineers would have to design, create, test, and validate the requested 
system within a hyper-secure isolated room, then deploy and supervise the operation of the system by 
the FBI.76 According to Apple, the technical assistance sought would be much more vast and complicated 
than simply pushing a few buttons, as the Government seemed to believe.77  
Third, Apple argued that the Government did not demonstrate that Apple’s assistance was 
necessary to effectuate the warrant.78 The Government did not exhaust all avenues for recovering the 
information, and ignored the fact that the FBI foreclosed an avenue when it changed the iCloud password 
associated with Farook’s iPhone, and prevented the phone from performing an automatic iCloud backup 
of the information contained on the phone.79 Moreover, the Government made no showing of whether 
or not it sought or received technical assistance from other federal agencies with expertise in digital 
forensics, which could negate the need for Apple to create a backdoor into the iPhone.80 Thus, in Apple’s 
opinion, the Order should not have been granted because the Government did not satisfy the factors 
under New York Telephone Co. 
 Finally, Apple argued that compliance with the Order would violate the First Amendment and the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.81 Specifically, the Government asked the court to compel Apple 
to write software that would eliminate safety features built into the iPhone in response to consumer 
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privacy concerns.82 Apple contended that the Order amounted to compelled speech and viewpoint 
discrimination.83 Under established law, computer code is treated like speech within the meaning of the 
First Amendment.84 Thus, whenever the Government seeks to compel speech, the First Amendment is 
triggered.85 Compelled speech can only be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to obtain a compelling state 
interest.86 Apple contended that in this instance, the Government could not meet this high standard.87 In 
particular, Apple argued that, although investigating terrorists is a legitimate interest, the government 
only produced speculative evidence that Farook’s iPhone might contain relevant information.88 Moreover, 
terrorists and other criminals use highly sophisticated encryption techniques and readily available 
applications (apps).89 As such, any information that could be on the phone could be protected behind 
several layers of non-Apple encryption.90 More importantly, the FBI foreclosed the option of backing up 
the data into the iCloud by changing the password, which certainly would have been a more narrowly 
tailored option.91 Thus, Apple believed that it could not be compelled to speak (write code) pursuant to 
the Order. 
 Apple also argued that the Order discriminated on the basis of Apple’s viewpoint.92 When Apple 
designed the iOS 9 software, it wrote code that announced the value it placed on data security and the 
privacy of its consumers by leaving out a backdoor for anyone, including Apple, to use.93 Thus, Apple 
argued that being compelled to write new software in accordance with the Government’s contrary view 
that national security trumps data security and consumer privacy violated its First Amendment rights and 
provided additional grounds to vacate the Order. 
 In addition to the First Amendment, Apple argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
prohibited the Government from compelling Apple to create the code.94 By conscripting Apple, a private 
party, with an attenuated connection to the crime to do the Government’s bidding, the Order violated 
Apple’s right to be free from “arbitrary deprivation of [its] liberty.”95 The touchstone of due process is 
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protection of the individual from arbitrary action by the government.96 However, the Order was clearly 
compelling Apple to do something it did not want to do, without any definitive showing that doing so 
would lead to any worthwhile information. Therefore, Apple argued that the action was arbitrary and 
Apple should be protected from having to do the Government’s bidding.97 
New York District Court Sides with Apple 
 While the battle between the FBI and Apple raged in California, the Government was trying to 
start another one in New York. In the Eastern District of New York, the Government sought an All Writs 
Act order requiring Apple to bypass the passcode security on an iPhone belonging to a confessed drug 
dealer.98 On February 29, 2016, Magistrate Judge Orenstein denied the order in a lengthy opinion that 
could be adequately described as a judicial spanking.99 The court recognized that there were significant 
competing interests at play, such as the commercial interest in conducting a lawful, private business as 
owners deem most productive, free from harmful governmental intrusion; individual safety and privacy; 
and national security.100 Siding with Apple, the court reasoned that these competing interests must be 
balanced and debated by legislators who are equipped to consider the technological and cultural realities 
of a modern world unconceived by their predecessors.101 Judge Orenstein concluded that “it would betray 
our constitutional heritage and our people’s claim to democratic governance for a judge to pretend that 
our Founders already had that debate, and ended it, in 1789.”102 Two days after the New York ruling, 
Apple filed a notice of supplemental authority with the Central District of California to “bring to the court’s 
attention” the scathing opinion.103  
An Anticlimactic Ending 
 Apple’s Motion to Vacate was scheduled for a March 22, 2016 hearing before Judge Pym.104 On 
March 21, Judge Pym stayed the Order requiring Apple to help the Government hack the iPhone, and 
cancelled the scheduled hearing.105 The hearing was cancelled until the FBI could determine whether an 
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unidentified third party could access the data on the iPhone, as it had promised.106 And it did. On March 
28, the Government filed a Status Report announcing that it had successfully accessed Farook’s phone 
and the data stored on it and no longer required Apple’s assistance.107 However, no details were provided 
about how or who helped the FBI gain access. As a result of this newfound access, the Government 
requested that the Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search dated February 16, 2016 be 
vacated.108 On March 29, 2016, the Order was vacated for good cause, and Apple’s Motion to Vacate was 
denied as moot.109 A statement issued by U.S. Attorney Eileen M. Decker on March 28 stated that the 
Government’s decision to request that the order be vacated “was based solely on the fact that, with the 
recent assistance of a third party, we are now able to unlock that iPhone without compromising any 
information.”110 Thus, the Government did not back off its position that the courts should and can compel 
a private party to assist in a Government investigation under the All Writs Act, even if it means creating 
technology that never existed before, and weakening a private company’s product. 
 The Status Report and the vacating of the Order may have brought the hotly contested battle 
between the FBI and Apple to an abrupt and somewhat mutually agreeable end, but the differing opinions 
of Judge Pym and Judge Orenstein leave more questions than answers. The most important questions: (1) 
whether national security trumps consumer privacy; (2) how far the government and courts can go in 
forcing private companies to help in investigations under the All Writs Act; and (3) who should decide, the 
courts or Congress, remain unsettled. But a clear answer is needed, and with the increasing reliance on 
technology as a necessary component of modern life, it is needed sooner rather than later. 
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